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The United States, China and Japan
In a Post-Vietnam Era

Tong-Chin Rhee
Nothing has been quite so traumatic as the frustrating experiences of the Vietnam war,
and nothing could quite equal the significance of this Asian conflict in terms of long-run
impact on the future direction of American foreign policy. The failure of American
deterrence in Vietnam has created popular doubts about the prospects of American
foreign policy and induced a sweeping reassessment of global commitmen ts of the United
States. An increasing number of influential Americans, including many leaders of the
Congress (both Democrats and Republicans), are voicing their uneasiness toward United
States commitments overseas and argue for a general retrenchment of her role in the
world. Given the increasingly complicated world situation, and the critical domestic
conditions in America, this criticism of America's post-war policy will intensify and will
eventually overhaul all of our foreign policy assumptions since 1945.
Despite the disappointing progress of the Paris negotiations, it is not unreasonable to
expect that the end is in sight. Or at least, the Paris peace talks herald the modest
beginning of an end to direct military involvements of the United States in Southeast Asia
or even in the Far East. In whatever way the conflict may end, there will be enormous
changes in diplomatic and foreign policy positions for all nations involved.
As the conflict nears its conclusion, there inevitably looms ahead a host of important
issues to consider: how will the experiences of the war affect the future of American
policy in Asia; what diplomatic revolution would these lessons entail for both Asia and
the United States; and how sweeping would the changes be for all concerned. These
questions are indeed important ones. And given the tempo and the nature of new trends
in Asia, they are extremely difficult problems to analyze at this time. However, an
attempt to assess them within the presently existing situations may not be entirely
fruitless. On the contrary, some valuable insights into the future may be gained.
Given the yet uncertain nature of a future peace in Vietnam - an important indicator
for the possible American attitu de toward Asia in the future - any prediction is a highly
risky proposition. Allowing, too, the fast tempo of modern events - particularly Asia
being in uncertain flux - the prospect of the 1970's is seemingly too distant to correctly
guage. Nonetheless, there are a number of points already being manifested clearly enough
to foresee some of the tendencies in Asia regarding the American position there.
First, all the presently existing indications are that] apan will strongly assert her
independent posture both diplomatically and militarily - including the desire for nuclear
armament. Second, Sino-Soviet confrontations will aggravate to the point where China
quite possibly would be well disposed to see the necessity and possibility of a detente
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with the United States. Undoubtedly, both trends will, to a great extent, affect the
European situation - including such problems as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the
East-West rapprochement. Third, Southeast Asia could conceivably fol1ow two divergent
policies. One would be a direct result of a fair and enduring peace from the Paris
negotiations. The other would be the result of an artificial peace - a pseudonym for
American defeat - made favorable to the National Liberation Front and North Vietnam.
These two possibilities would have a very direct impact on the attitudes of not only
Sou theast Asian nations but Far Eastern nations as well to America's role in the Asian
Continent.
In case of a genuine, endurable peace and stability, it can be safely expected that the
nations in Southeast Asia will more or less pursue very similar policies up to this time perhaps veering a bit more toward a neutral stance. 1 But again, depending upon the
possibility of a Sino-American detente, the degree of threat to the general balance in the
region will be decided. However, should the outcome of the Paris negotiations be a
camouflaged defeat of American power, we ought to assume the outright rush of most of
the nations in that area to a hostile neutrality to the United States, and toward efforts of
mending fences with the Chinese. Again, however, the Sino-American detente may have a
different effect, and the result is yet to be seen.
Another quite distinct certainty will be the changed American philosophy and attitude
toward problems of security , crisis, and intervention. The widespread reassessment of the
fundamental tenets of American policy will unmistakably result in the sweeping rejection
of all the American assumptions concerning Asia since 1945. The result would be the
gradual transformation of the foundations of American foreign policy from the simplistic
world views to a recognition of the growing need for sophistication - less idealistic and
universal , but more realistic and pragmatic. In prac tice, this would mean more detached
responses to international crises - an "even-handed" policy as the Nixon Administration
calls it. Favoring more sophisticated diplomatic alignments transcending ideological
trappings, the United States will tend more toward defining genuine national interests
from imaginary ones. American diplomatic and military reactions would be more
cautious, and would emphasize the concept of "crisis management." Rather than rushing
into any and all commitments, Washington's policy would be measuring its actions against
the feasibility of greater regional efforts and the traditional concept of balance of power.
If this is the logically expected reaction to the lessons of the Vietnam war, one cannot
readily rule out the considerable danger of neo-isolationistic thinking in the United
States. Hard as it is to believe that the United States would totally reverse from
interventionism to strict isolation, it is not a wholly impossible diagnosis, given the
dimension and nature of serious domestic difficulties in the country. The civil rights crisis
and other domestic demands could eventually have greater influence on American foreign
policy than many would now care to admit. If other powers judge - rightly or wrongly that the United States would be too greatly hindered by domestic crises to play a
balancing role in the world, American presence in the international community could lose
a good deal of credibility.
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In all these various possibilities, there is little doubt that American policy position will
undergo rather revolutionary changes in the coming decade. The gradual and inevitable
retrenchment of global commitments would be most likely followed by an American
desire to develop viable relations with nations - especially in Asia - in order to be able
to concentrate on more crucial areas of vital national interests - such as Western Europe,
Latin America and the Middle East, perhaps in that order of priority. These hitherto
neglected areas are already receiving closer attention from the Nixon Administration.
In an increasingly polycentric political condition and the virtual nullification of
nuclear weaponry as a workable instrument of policy, the immedia te impact on Asia of
the changing American position will of necessity be a gradual but certain withdrawal of
American commitments - first military and then perhaps even political. On the other
hand, it is expected that the United States will show added interest in accelerating
diplomatic efforts to settle all the pending problems with a view to a rather permanent
disengagement. This process of disengagement will occur first with the Japanese starting with the reluctant reversion of Okinawa and the revision of the security
arrangement. Without the military security arrangement - or with the extremely
complicated one - with the Japanese and withou t the Okinawa base, the United States will
be eventually forced to make a drastic turn-about in the Far East. American military
presence in Korea will be pha~ed out - as indirectly shown through the recent exercise
Focus Retina - and Washington may be willing to cut the presence of the Seventh Fleet
around Taiwan as well. 2
As yet, the possible pros and cons of these eventualities are not to be fully known. But
the greatest danger is that the United States - as a result of the Vietnam conflict - might
be overly tempted to dispense with the proper balance between her old posture and the
newly emerging one. Should this important balance be destroyed, and if the United States
were to dash blindly in the opposite direction due to her revulsion and fear of further
entanglements, a great damage to the world balance of power could not be avoided especially in the Far East.
American policy has been traditionally based on "axioms and instinct" and generally
failed to pursue detached and calculating involvements based on demonstrated national
interests. This had meant that American responses to crises - large and small - have been
mainly idealistic and universalistic. During the era of clear-cu t American superiority , this
idealistic universalism - reinforced by the reality of Pax Americana - was successfully
sustained. However, particularly with the Vietnam war, in which the inertia was suddenly
confronted with enormous costs and sacrifices, the adherence to this practice brought
forth deepening frustrations of failure.
Being no longer bipolaric, the conditions of the post-Vietnam era will be one of
complexity, and the American interests will largely be uncertain and unclear. And they
will be much more narrowly defined. The sources of danger to world peace and stability
will arise from multiple sources , which have not so far played any major role. From the
American viewpoint, then, the reactions to world crises would have to be highly selective ,
while constantly watching for the problems of maintaining domestic tranquility and
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international equilibrium.
The sources of an uncertain future in Asia are the rapidly changing posture of Japan,
the yet unpredictable consequences of China's internal troubles and the deteriorating
Sino-Soviet relations.
Japan's position in the 1970's will largely depend on two important issues - the
emotional problem of rising anti-Americanism and the other more clear-cu t issues such as
nuclear armament, Okinawa, the security arrangement, and a host of other controversial
issues with the United States.
For those who have been familiar with the changing mood of the Japanese people,
their growing desire for independent thinking and their increasing anti-American feelings
are not particularly surprising. Japan has been more and more expressing her differences
since the time of the San Francisco Treaty, and Sato's government has almost formally
gone into a period of self-assertion. The Vietnam conflict added further justification for
the radical change in the Japanese position. Not only is there widespread reassessment of
the future worth of the security arrangement with the United States (including the
"nuclear umbrella") , but also growing discussions of unilateral agreements with China and
the Soviet Union.
Anti-Americanism has existed - although not publicly discharged during the years of
clear-cut dependence on the United States - since the two atomic bombs were dropped
on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. More than Americans have been prepared to admit, the
Japanese feel resentment and humiliation because of the nuclear attacks on their land.
The degree of such feelings is understandable only when we take into account the
universally violent reactions of the normally apolitical Japanese - including those who
are highly pro-American on other issues. As Kei Wakaizumi recently explained in an
article : "(While Japanese feel shame at their behavior toward their neighbors, Hiroshima
and Nagasaki erased the sense of guilt Japanese might have felt toward the United States
because of Pearl Harbor. )"3
This basic reversal (at least since the anti-American feelings have been largely hidden
beneath the surface of pretended friendliness toward America) has been shown in an
increasing number of instances in recent years. The public poll taken in January, 1967,
showed that the United States was replaced by Switzerland as the best liked foreign
nation among the Japanese. This tendency will, in my opinion , continue. 4 The
widespread attribu tion of social ills in Japan to "sinister" American influences since 1945
is another evidence of growing Japanese resentmen t toward Americans. An old Japanese
general of the Imperial Army has publicly degraded the worth of American influenced
training methods in the Japanese self-defense forces , while others publicly stated their
willingness to have used atomic bombs on the United States had they been available to
them before their surrender. The Japanese press has been generally acerbic to the United
States in such events as Svetlana's defection, and particularly the American role in the
Vietnam conflict, not to mention the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to
Japan in 1960, and the distinct govern men tal opposition to Presiden t Johnson's proposed
visit to Japan in 1966 after the Manila Conference. Much more significant and potentially
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ominous is the Japanese treatment of the racially mixed children of the American GI's
and Japanese girls. Through voluntary organizations and donations, the Japanese have
expressed their revulsion against the "polluted breed" and managed to emigrate a large
number of these children to Latin American countries.
Besides this neo-Shintoistic ethnocentrism and seemingly radical, chauvinistic
tendency (reminiscent of the violent 1930's or the over-confident years after the Meiji
Restoration), there are other public, potentially more threatening incidents of
an ti-Americanism.
The case in point is the "private trade agreement" signed between Red China and the
so-called "non-government" Japanese trade delegation on March 5, 1968. Although the
Japanese delegation was nominally a non-governmental one and thus cannot commit the
Japanese government to any specific policies, the very fact that it was headed by a leading
member of the J apanese Diet and of Sato's ruling Liberal Democratic Party indicated the
importance of the mission and the governmental collusion. Furthermore, the joint
communique issued in Peking was based on the principle of the "Inseparability of Politics
and Economics," and contained clearly anti-American tones.
Firstly, the Peking authorities indicated that the major obstacles to the harmonization
of Sino-Japanese relations had been American imperialism and Japan's official policy of
hostility toward China - presumably under American pressure. To this, the Japanese
delegation expressed its deep understanding and promised renewed efforts to normalize
the relations between the two nations. Secondly, the Chinese re-emphasized the
importance of "three political principles" and the principle of "the inseparability of
politics and economics," with which the Japanese expressed their agreement. Thirdly ,
both sides recognized that the improvement of economic relations contributed to the
general normalization of political relations between them. Fourthly, both sides
recognized the above mentioned principles as the fundamental basis for Sino-Japanese
relations. The key to the understanding of this agreement was the so-called three political
principles, which were: 1) a non-hostile attitude toward China ; 2) non-participation in
the international plot of the "Two-China Policy," and 3) non-interference in the
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. 5
As can easily be surmised from this agreement, the comfortable expectation, held by
Washington, that the Japanese could be expected to playa more responsible role in the
maintenance of an Asian balance of power - and in American favor - may not be
fulftlled. On the contrary, as the 1970's approach and as the Japanese gradually regain
their national "confidence" - a phenomenon similar to the Meiji and the so-called Showa
Restoration - it may not be too far-fetched to expect a rather startling volte face in their
attitudes toward the outside world. Their spectacular economic prosperity, the nature
and possible future of the Siberian agreement with the Soviet Union, and the "Grand
Tour" of Eisaku Sato through Asian nations in 1967 may have a revolutionizing impact
on the future policy of Japan - even to the point of pursuing foreign policies basically as
aggressive as in the 1930's and 1940's.
These important changes in Japanese thinking have recently aroused extensive
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discussion among the Japanese concerning the Japan-American Mutual Security Treaty,
rearmament, nuclear armament and Japan's economic and military role in Asia and
elsewhere.
This year the Japan-American mutual defense arrangement will come to a point of
fierce national debate and controversy in Japan. Although no specific action is necessary
for the automatic extension of the treaty, the volatile atmosphere of Japanese domestic
opinion would make it very difficult for the Tokyo Government to risk its automatic
continuation without some kind of pre-arrangement with the United States, such as the
reversion of Okinawa. The increasing need of normalizing relations with Peking (including
the rising demand for political recognition), Chinese nuclear weaponry, the Vietnam
conflict, America's military bases in Japan, the Pueblo Incident, and the latest crisis over
the downed in telligence plane in the Sea of Japan have all too strongly increased the
Japanese opposition to the Treaty. Much more important, Japan keenly feels that
American involvemen t in Asia is highly risky and could easily en tangle the Japanese in a
political cuI de sac. This fear is further increased as the post-Vietnam prospect seems to
point toward the general retrenchment of American commitment. Japan also senses the
growing incapacity and unwillingness of the United States to involve herself in future
Asian crises. Should this be the case, Japan is reluctant to be involved in acts of hostility
in Asia with which she herself will someday have to come to terms. In thIs context, the
automatic renewal of the security treaty is a particularly repulsive proposition to a
growing majority of Japanese people.
The revulsion toward the security arrangemen t goes deeper. Firstly, many leaders of
the older generation are on the way out with their burdensome past. And the younger
generation in Japan does not share the notion of Japanese guilt for the last war, and thus
can take independent views toward all the important policy issues - including relations
with the United States. Secondly, the regained national confidence and resurgent
nationalism will most likely demand a restoration of Japanese power on a wider scale commensurate with the economic and financial strength of the country. In this sense, the
restrictive and one-sided security arrangement with the United States is viewed with
anathema. Thirdly, the American "nuclear umbrella" over Japan has largely lost its
credence, and is not likely to have the same meaning for Japan as in the past. Fourthly,
the increasing leftist influence (more and more nationalistic) would doubly harm Japan's
relations with the United States.
If this reshaping proceeds without any unexpected turn of events, it appears at the
momen t that Japan is likely to completely renounce the Treaty after 1970 - when the
abrogation can be attained simply by one-year's notice . This abrogation will naturally
have a direct affect on the Japanese conventional as well as nuclear armament.
As to the conventional rearmament, Japan has made a substantial advance toward
self-sufficiency through three successive phases of improvement. In addition to
well-trained land forces (emphasizing heavy and mechanized weapons of all kinds), Japan
has considerably strengthened her anti-submarine naval forces as well as her air power.
Clearly, the present strength is not adequate for independent self-defense. However,
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depending upon the changing attitude and policy, proper correction will not be a difficult
problem at all for Japan. In addition, Japan's missile capability is potentially substantial
as many now view Tokyo's efforts only next to the two Superpowers'.
Concerning nuclear armament, there are undoubtedly much more difficult problems
for Japan to deal with: 1) domestic opposition - especially from leftist political
elements ; 2) the strong possibility of adverse reactions from other Asian nations which
had in the past experienced Japanese aggression; 3) the uncertain reactions of major
nuclear and non-nuclear powers - particularly of Red China, the Soviet Union, the
United States, India and Australia; and 4) the problems of the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty.
These difficulties notwithstanding, Japan could easily make gigantic headway toward
producing nuclear weapons once her future domestic and foreign policies are settled.
Granting that Japan desires to possess nuclear weapons - judging from the present signs
in Japan - the next question is her physical capability for producing these weapons.
According to the latest study, the amount of plutonium required for producing a nuclear
weapon is about six kilograms. Under the present conditions, Japan is expected to have
nuclear electrical generating capacities of about 2,000 megawatts by 1980, which is
equivalent to 5,000 kilograms of plutonium every year - some 800 nuclear weapons. 6
As of today, it is widely reported that the Japanese scientists have successfully
developed their own techniques for producing enriched uranium - sufficiently
concentrated to manufacture nuclear weapons of substantial yield. The Radioisotope
Laboratory of Tokai has spent two and one half years of research in completing
experiments on equipment for "enriching natural uranium through gaseous diffusion
method." The Japanese report that they have now demonstrated the potential for
producing enriched uranium - more easily fissionable than the more plentiful unionium
U-238.
Japan is presently dependent upon outside sources for the supply of enriched uranium.
She bought or rented 166,075 grams of enriched uranium in 1967 - most of it from the
United States. In the first half of 1968, the import of uranium reached the figure of
140,000 grams. Furthermore, the Japanese Government has allocated $250 million for
future purchase. This imported material is being used through the gaseous diffusion
method to produce enriched uranium with high U-235 con ten t.7 However, whatever the
technical points, the strongest indication is that Japan is not sparing any efforts in order
to prepare herself for the future policy of nuclear armament. In fact, the likelihood in the
near future of Japan being armed in a nuclear fashion is potentially very ominous.
The logical corollary to the problem of nuclear armament is the present Japanese
attitude toward the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Naturally, Japan has yet to sign the
treaty. But judging from the present mood, the outcome is still highly uncertain. On the
surface, the immediate reaction to the treaty is not entirely unfavorable. However, a
closer examination reveals widespread opposition to the pact. Some argue that Japan
should definitely refuse to sign the treaty and some say that she should not sign before
West Germany does. Indeed, the Japanese Foreign Office has a lengthy list of objections.
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First, the Japanese object to the unequal nature of the treaty and its absence of
meaningful military value. The nuclear powers have paid lip service to the eventual
nuclear disarmament in the preamble, but failed to provide any significant provision to
that effect. On the other hand, non-nuclear powers must not only pledge abnegation of
nuclear weapons, but must also submit to unduly prohibitive inspections to ensure such
self-denial. Hence, they feel - like the West Germans - that the treaty was solely
designed to protect and perpetuate the nuclear powers' monopoly of the weapons - thus
allowing them undue political and military leverage on vital global questions. Second, the
inspection procedures are considered highly unfair to Japan. While the nuclear powers are
not subject to inspection, the non-nuclear powers of Western Europe will be inspected
only by Euratom - "a family organization of six Western European states" - with
perhaps nominal participation by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Japan - on
the other hand - will have to submit to inspection by an international agency, comprising
ninety-six nations including the Soviet Union and other Communist nations. These
discriminatory inspection procedures are galling to Japan, and as an Asian nation, Japan
feels she was unfairly treated in the existing treaty.
Third, the Japanese argue that nuclear knowledge is still in its in fancy, and nobody can
foretell the potentially unlimited possibility of future progress in nuclear science. Should
Japan accept the treaty, and be forced to submit to inspection, all the peaceful uses of
atomic energy in Japan could suffer a dreadful setback. Fourth, as Red China and France
remain uncommitted, Japan feels that the treaty has no universal applicability. Without
this universality, the Japanese doubt the wisdom of tying their hands indefinitely.
Finally, the Japanese - like many of the European nations - maintain that the
Americans have no justification for keeping the uranium-enrichment process to
themselves as the treaty prohibits the manufacture of atomic bombs. 8
Among these reasons for their hesitation, I would venture to say that the real cause of
alarm is the possibility that by signing the treaty they are afraid that they may be
irreparably limiting freedom of action for the future. As a great economic power, any
indefinite political and military abnegation is an obnoxious proposition for Japan.
Of greater significance, Masami Takatsuji, Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau,
stated in the House of Councillors that:
It is evident that nuclear weapons belong in the category of those which we are
not authorized [by the Constitution 1 to possess. But when scientific technology
advances and it becomes possible to manufacture nuclear weapons which are in
conformity with the purpose and within the limits of self-defense, then I don't
believe it would be necessarily unconstitutional for us to own such weapons. 9
When later questioned, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato pointedly stated that he found
nothing in the statement that he felt compelled to correct.
Largely responsible for this change of attitude in Japan is her renaissant nationalism
and national desire for diplomatic independence and equality with the United States.
Many leaders in Japan now think that the only way to attain diplomatic parity with
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Washington, and political influence in world affairs is through nuclear armament - as a
political instrument. Naturally, then, the serious problem for the United States and others
in the 1970's is not the mere possibility of Japanese nuclear armament but obviously the
basic political intentions behind it. As has already been discussed, should the reversion of
Okinawa be decided this year, and the abrogation of the security treaty becomes a reality
after 1970, the enormity of complications in American policy in Asia would be greater
than ever. Undoubtedly, under such circumstances, any idea in Washington that Japan
may be persuaded to playa complementary role with the United States in maintaining
the balance of power in Asia could very well be a total illusion. Or supposing Japan's
nominal cooperation, Tokyo's aims would not be to foster an Asian political climate
likely to lead to harmony with American goals for a genuinely stable Asia. Equally
important is the beneath-the-surface case of intense anti-Americanism in Japan and how
this will show through the nuclear capability. One thing is quite clear, however, that is,
that Japan will play a role of pitting the powers against each other in Asia, namely
between the Soviet Union, China and the United States.
The range of disagreements between Washington and Tokyo is already wide and deep.
Besides the problems already discussed, there are the equally inflammatory problems of
fishery disputes, of air line rights, and of a host of trading problems between the two
countries. All of these problems could have serious political consequences. And this will
depend on the larger picture of the political atmosphere now prevailing and that which
will prevail between the two countries. Again, the chances of real harmony are rather
slim.
The uncertain quality of Japanese-American relations in the future necessarily make
the relations between Peking and Washington highly crucial. Needless to say, the
importance of this relationship ought not to be measured in the present framework of
tension and mutual hostility. All the present indications - although weak at the moment
- are that all the bad Sino-American experiences of the past may and could be dispelled
with mutual effort. And even with the many problems besetting normal relations between
the two countries, there is still evidence that a future detente can be worked out. Should
somehow tensions dissipate and normal relations resume, then , it is very plausible to
imagine the total obsolescence of all the past assumptions in the two nations' policies for
each other. Moreover, the very likelihood of a Sino-American entente for maintaining
peace and stability in Asia - especially against increasingly dangerous Japan - may not
be an act of sheer fantasy in the 1970's and 1980's.
Though slim, chances of composing the differences between Washington and Peking
have existed before. The Warsaw meetings provided such an instrument. Only the proper
atmosphere was lacking. The successful outcome of the Paris peace talks on Vietnam when it comes - should have a beneficial effect on the process of rapprochement
between the two. The aggravating tempo of Sino-Soviet disputes will increase
justifications - at least for the Chinese - for such a cooling-off process, and so will the
American retrenchment from Asia and the Japanese self-assertion in the near future.
Conversely, Sino-American detente could easily aid the United States in other sensitive
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areas of contact with the Soviet Union - such as arms control, European detente, and
the Middle East solution, etc.
Besides the changing international scene, there is also a favorable development of
atmosphere - if not anything else as yet - both in China and in the United States. The
culmination of this rapprochement, should it materialize, could lead to lasting relations
between China and America. In this context, some consideration should now be directed
to the domestic conditions in both countries.
Because of the unclear nature of the Great Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard
Movement, no present knowledge available could enable us to correctly assess the
significance and the motives of the movement in China for the past few years. However,
basing our judgment on the fundamental character of the Chinese mind, it seems to be
rather erroneous for us to blandly accept the widely considered views of the journalistic
coverage in the West. Namely, despite the reported incidents of widespread national
discordance and disunity, the revolution did not quite disrupt China to the degree we in
the West have so far presumed. One thing which is clear from hindsight (although it
may be yet too risky to make a definite judgment) is that the movement was somehow
motivated by Machiavellian considerations of preparing China and her people for future
possibilities of a general detente with the United States. The past record certainly shows
that China has been generally moderate in her relations with the United States, if not in
her statements - which were militant and biligerent. Mao Tse-tung and his cohorts - as
the assessment may seem rather implausible at this point - may have tried to regiment
and unify China under their undisputed control so as to be able to bring China to a
radically different course of action and policy towards the outside world such as to be
able to negotiate without worries of domestic opposition or disturbances. 1 0 Once Mao's
unrestricted control of the party and government is established, the newly consolidated
leaders - they might have calculated - could bring the country back to international
normalcy. Certainly, the past experiences of violent anti-Americanism (quite artificial and
officially organized) are not to be so easily dispelled - except under a leadership of a
united party under an iron control.
The widening differences with the Soviet Union - ideologically but more importantly
in the form of traditional national hostility - and the rising tide of nationalization of the
communist movement everywhere would have been the symptom of the Chinese desire to
have an opportunity to create favorable conditions for composing the differences with
the United States. Certainly, too, the Chinese could not have failed to sense the rather
radical changes taking place in American policies for Asia - gradually but inexorably
emerging due to the Vietnam war and the resultant reappraisal. The Chinese leaders could
also have sensed the growing American desire for retrenchment of military and political
commitments in Asia - a desire for a more permanent solution for a stable Asia.
Warsaw meetings have provided valuable channels of communication between Peking
and Washington. But while the Cultural Revolution was in process and while the outcome
of the Vietnam war was uncertain, neither of the powers could afford to take any
meaningful steps toward a diplomatic breakthrough. However, presently, the slowness
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notwithstanding, it seems that both sides are gradually seeing the end of the long tunnel
- and cautiously groping for a contact. Certainly, the Chinese proposal for a meeting in
Warsaw on February 20, 1969 has to be interpreted in this context. The cancellation of
the meeting may have been caused, though, not particularly because of the defection of
the Chinese diplomat in Europe, but more possibly because of the yet uncertain ending of
the Chinese domestic crisis.
If anything, then , the Ninth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party - by
at least nominally resolving the domestic crisis and by upholding Mao's line of policy must necessarily be interpreted to have provided the Chinese government with a proper
foundation for a diplomatic volte face - very possibly a detente with the United States
on all the pending issues in Asia. This process will be made clearer as the Paris
negotiations approach the end. Furthermore , the Chinese responses to the recent State
Department's partial lifting of the travel ban to China should be both highly interesting
and revealing. This has yet to be seen.
In the light of the rapid deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations - Chen Pao
(Damansky) Island clashes - the most interesting thing is that China has been reported to
have been severely punishing its citizens who listen to Radio Moscow (with heavy prison
sentences or even the firing squad) for the past six months or so. On the other hand,
curiously enough, only "re-education" was meted out to those who listen to the Voice of
America. 11 Although seemingly a minor item, the incident - taking place in Red China ought to be construed a little more imaginatively as showing far more significant aspects
and motives of the Chinese government toward the United States.
On our side, the pressure is mounting for a sweeping reassessment of America's China
Policy. 'Furthermore, the Nixon Administration (after the failure of the Warsaw meeting)
was reportedly hoping for the emergence of a new and fresh program from the Chinese
Communist Party Congress, which "will permit the start of a substantive dialogue with
the United States.,,12 Assuredly, the American intent to come to terms with the Chinese
has been expressed often - publicly or in the secret councils of the state - since the
Kennedy Administration. President Nixon - mindful of the problems of Western Europe
and the Middle East - has accepted basically European oriented policies since his
inauguration. Unlike Walt Rostow, Henry Kissinger's views may have greater meaning
than one could understand at this early stage. Secretary of State Rogers' statements have
also expressed the Administration's desire for improved relations with China.
Besides the Administration's point of view, other potent voices are being heard more
frequently - all favoring a radical change in American policy, particularly in Asia. The
most interesting proposal so far - seen from many angles - has come from Theodore
Sorensen. Perhaps, it is well to consider his proposal at length to see if there are any
elements conductive to inducing the Chinese to an understanding.
. . . it is not in our interest to take sides in this dispute [the Sino-Soviet border
clashes 1 ... or to give either nation grounds for charging that we have taken sides. I
am further suggesting that, if such a stance is the right one, we should no longer
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continue our policy of making a greater effort toward understanding and friendly
relations with the Soviet Union than we do with Communist China . ..
We should be equally vigilant in our policies toward both nations. We should be
equally realistic about the substantive as well as the ideological conflicts that divide
us from both nations ....
Some may reply that China is more hostile and Russia more friendly. It is true
that Peking's words have been more hostile than Moscow's, and any overtures we
make now may well be rejected. But Moscow's deeds have been more threatening
than Peking's; and surely our policy in terms of what we seek should not place
more importance on words than on deeds. For it is the Soviets, not the Chinese ,
who are the chief suppliers of weapons used against our troops by the North
Vietnamese and Vietcong ....
. . . Propaganda from Peking may be far more harsh and belligerent than the
anti-American propaganda emanating from Moscow; but China in fact cannot now
match the Soviet Union's ... capability to sustain a major threat to this country's
very existence, and that difference ... surely speaks louder than any difference in
propaganda. I3
Indeed, Sorensen 's argument was that China has to be dealt with separately and that
policy considerations pertaining to the Soviet Union should not be extended to influence
American position toward China. China ought to be considered solely on the basis of and
in the context of the Asian situation.1 4 So far his thoughts seem to have a considerable
number of subscribers both in and out of the Administration.
Clearly , then, there is a mounting argument for a realistic approach to the Asian
problem in the United States. And judging from Nixon's performance so far, the likely
course would be the adoption of a similar policy - provided, of course, there is a greater
preparation of domestic opinion. But again, there is already an important surge of public
demand to change our posture to China, borne out by many public opinion polls.
Should the Japanese position prove to be as independent and truculent as it now tends
to be in the next decade , together with their increasing anti-Americanism, there will
certainly be greater efforts toward composing differences between Peking and
Washington. The concept of balance of power in a traditional sense will surely replace the
past alignment pattern along the ideological lines. The result, curiously enough, may not
be too different from the scenes of the 1930's - namely, the renewal of the balancing
role of the United States and China against the Japanese and others' position in Asia.
Furthermore, such a line-up in Asia may even have a healthy effect on the European
detente between the Soviet bloc and the Western European nations - and might even
materialize the Gaullist schemes of European unity. At this point, this might even be a
better proposition for the United States than the inertial continuation of bloc-to-bloc
confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Perhaps also a solution to the
German question may be found when more friendly relations are established between the
East and West.
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Difficulties and uncertainties surely lie ahead, and I do not intend to suggest that the
above-mentioned will be immediately realized. However, I do mean to suggest that the
kind of diplomatic problems the United States will have to face tomorrow will be
radically different from those since 1945. A diplomatic revolution will have been created
by the Vietnam catalyst.
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1 Cambodia's pOSitIOn is an indication of the kind of policies the Southeast Asian nations would
pursue after "Vietnam." At present even Thailand's future posture is unpredictable.
2 North Korea's ability to create tension will duly diminish should Sino-American and
American-Soviet detentes materialize. Even at the present, it is generally presumed that Pyungyang
is acting alone without prior consultation with either of the Communist capitals.
3 Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970," Foreign Affairs (April, 1969), p. 510.
4 The poll was taken by Central Survey Institute in January, and published by Shukan Jiji, February
4, 1967. The information is taken from George R. Packard III, "Living with the Real Japan,"
Foreign Affairs (October, 1967), p. 200.
5 See The New York Times, March 6, and 8, 1968. As usual, even The New York Times failed to
cover the events fully. For the general failure of the American press in reporting Japanese events,
see George R. Packard III, "Living with the Real Japan," Foreign Affairs (October, 1967). The
content of this was drawn from Choong Ang Ilbo, Seoul, Korea, March, 14, 1968.
6 In this case, Japan's long-range potential is far greater than that of West Germany. See Bruce L. R.
Smith, "The Non-Proliferation Treaty and East-West Detente," Journal of International Affairs,
XXII, No.1 (1968), p. 98.
7 Philip Shabecoff, "Japanese Master a Technique for Making Enriched Uranium," The New York
Times, April 1, 1969.
8 Takashi Oka, "Atom Pact Faces Hurdles in Japan," The New York Times, March 16, 1969.
9 Kiyoaki Murata, "Japan and Non-Proliferation," The Japan Times, June 10, 1967.
10 Essentially it was a struggle between pro-Moscow and "Sinophile " factions in China. Mao-Lin's
victory in the Ninth Congress shows the triumph of nationalistic policies over those of
international ideology.
11 "China's No.1 Foe," The Periscope, Newsweek, April 14, 1969. p. 31.
12 Peter Grose, "Washington Hopes Peking Meeting Leads to Talks with U.S.," The New York Times,
April 2, 1969. Note also President Nixon's speech in the United Nations.
13 Theodore Sorensen's speech at National Committee on United States-China Relations in March,
1969.
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14 Allen S. Whiting's recent article in Look also bolsters Sorensen's position. Whiting claims, and the
facts themselves evidence, that Red China has exercised a good deal of caution and moderation in
the Vietnam War. See "How We Almost Went to War With China," Look, April 29, 1969. pp.
76-79. A similar position is shown by Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, New York ,
Praeger, 1965.
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